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TEMPORAL INTERVALS AND TEMPORAL ORDER*
Paul NEEDHAM
In philosophical discussions about the nature of time, instants have
long been a source of controversy, a good example being Aristotle's
problem about the state of motion of a body at the instant of change
between rest and motion. For the foundations of physics it is perhaps
unclear, but by no means a forgone conclusion, that instants really are
necessary in the basic ontology. On the other hand, in the analysis of
natural language it is doubtful whether instants have any basic role to
play. In the simple and straightforward cases, it seems that predicates
of natural language do not hold relative to instants of time. Consider
an activity predicate like 'runs', for example. The activity can only
occur during an interval o f  time sufficiently long to  encompass a
minimum of the necessary movements involved. To say that it is true
of an instant must involve some convention according to which the
instant is a member o f  an interval during which the running takes
place. There are other predicates, like moving at a certain velocity
for which there does not seem to be a minimum period during which
they can hold. These might be classified as states, with the common
feature that they are true of every subinterval of any interval during
which they hold. And again there seems to be no need to call upon
instants: but if  one does, then being true of an instant would involve
reference to the containing interval.
It would take me beyond the scope o f  this paper to pursue the
details of this classification of predicates of times, with a correspond-
ing treatment o f tense and aspect, which I  believe possible on the
basis of temporal intervals. My aim here is just to provide an account
of the fundamental notion o f  a temporal interval underlying the
analysis. (
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(*) I  am grateful to Wlodzimierz Rabinowlez, Lars Lindahl and Kaj Borge Hansen
for helpful comments and discussions of earlier versions of this paper.
(') I t  will perhaps forestall misunderstanding on this point to say that no attempt is
made to develope a corresponding propositional tense logic where the intervals would
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is intended to comprise intervals and no more, so that they can be
conceived as fundamental rather than defined as sets o f  instants.
There is just one primitive, the symmetric relation o f  separation of
Lesniewski's mereology, in  terms o f  which a ll other necessary
concepts can be defined. The paper might be of independent interest
to students of mereology in as much as the sum operation is restricted
so that not any arbitrary pair of individuals can be summed, and in a
subsequent development the relation o f  separation is distinguished
from that of non-overlapping.
A logic of intervals akin to the one proposed here has already been
published (Hamblin (1969) and (1971)). Hamblin's system is also
based on a single primitive, the two-place relation abuts at the earlier
end. However, the work presented here differs from Hamblin's in a
number of respects. Most importantly, the present system is explicitly
based on mereological ideas in such a way that not only are the two
notions of abutment and temporal order involved in Hamblin's basic
notion distinguished ; the temporal ordering itself is built up from a
symmetric mereological primitive. It seems to me there is something
to be said fo r building up the temporal order in this way, and a
comparison with the ordering of the real numbers may help to make
this clear.
A dyadic order relation always has a converse which is also an
order relation. Therefore, in order to give a sense or direction to a
linear order something must be said in addition to distinguish between
these two relations. In  the case o f  the real numbers, there is an
algebraic structure over and above the basic order properties which
imply that the relation usually signified by '> '  receives the interpreta-
tion 'greater than' and not 'less than'. This is brought out nicely in
Lang's formulation of the real number system (Lang (1969)), where a
definition o f  the 'greater than' relation is  provided which takes
advantage of this algebraic structure and distinguishes it from a mere
order relation. A subset of the real numbers P of positive elements is
selected satisfying
be confined to the metalanguage. My view is that this sort of tense logic is irrelevant to
the problems of the analysis of natural language ; but of course the task remains open to
anyone who considers it a sufficiently well motivated one.
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(i) E i t h e r x E P or —x e P or x 0 ,  and these alternatives are
mutually exclusive.
(ii) I f  x, y E P, then both x +y P  and xy E P.
The 'greater than' relation can then be defined by stipulating that
'x > 0' stands for 'x EP' and 'y >x'  stands for 'y — x E P'. Now, on the
basis o f the other axioms for the real numbers, I  exists, and it  can
easily be shown that I is positive. For by (i), either I E P or — I e P, but
not both. But i f  — 1 E P, then (-1 ) (-1 ) E P by (ii);  i.e. l E P  — a
contradiction. Hence, 1 eP and so 1 >O. Then 2 =  1 + 1 EP, 3 =
2 + 1 EP, and so on.
Similarly with time, it seems that the 'later than' relation involves a
sense or direction over and above the basic properties involved in
establishing just a  linear ordering. There are, i t  seems, ways o f
distinguishing 'earlier than' and 'later than' which imply that they are
more than mere order relations. Bu t  in  virtue o f  what additional
structure, by analogy with the algebraic structure of the real numbers,
is this the case? A  set o f  times corresponding to  Lang's positive
elements cannot be selected by choosing a time as the origin (as in the
dating system) and defining the set as all those times in the future of
this fixed time. This just means t i m e s  later than the origin», and
relies upon the relation we are trying to define. No r can indexical
distinctions of past, present and future be used for this purpose since
they do not denote fixed times. Perhaps the answer lies in the concept
of causation, but 1 have no such theory to present on this occasion. In
the absence of an account of this sort, a theory confining itself to the
linear order of time should be presented in such a way that it is clear
that it has nothing to say about direction and the distinctions of past
and future. (Hopefully, it  might then provide a framework within
which such an account could be developed.) Such a theory of linear
order expresses no more than that certain times lie between others,
the fundamental order concept being that of a three-place between-
ness relation. The procedure adopted in the theory presented here is
to define a betweenness relation in terms of which the linear ordering
of time is expressed. A dyadic order relation can then be defined on
the basis o f  the betweenness relation, but this is not analogous to
Lang's definition of 'greater than', the relation so defined having only
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certain necessary properties o f  the 'earlier than' and 'la ter than'
relations, not sufficient to distinguish the two.
Finally, the last section deals briefly with instants. It has often been
suggested that instants are involved in  so-called achievments and
success verbs. Although this is a point on which I  have considerable
doubts, it is perhaps appropriate to indicate how instants are related to
the intervals discussed here. Accordingly, some modifications of the
basic system which allow instants to enter the universe of discourse
are outlined in the final section.
In the 1920s Tarski developed a geometry which was not based on
the notion of a point (Tarski (1956)). His geometry of solids, as he
called it ,  was based on Lesniewski's mereology with  a  primitive
dyadic 'part of' relation. Just one specifically geometric primitive was
required in addition, and that was the notion of a sphere. The logic of
intervals presented here follows a pattern of development similar to
Tarski's, though there is some modification of approach which allows
that the only primitive concept required is a mereological relation.
The relation o f separation has been chosen following Leonard and
Goodman's treatment of mereology (Leonard and Goodman (1940)),
part of which has been adopted here. All other relevant notions can be
defined within the first order predicate calculus with identity.
The system o f  mereology has not been adopted in  its entirety
because the operation of summation is too broad. There the sum of a
class o f  individuals is an individual containing all the component
individuals of the class as parts and having no part separate from all
the component individuals. The existence of a unique sum is guaran-
teed by the axioms without any restriction on the relations between
the individuals in  the class summed. Such sums could well have
unconnected parts, and this is a feature characteristically lacking in
intervals as ordinarily conceived. The sum operation is restricted
here, and for this reason no analogue of Tarski's geometric primitiVe
'sphere' is required.
To begin with, two definitions in terms of the primitive relation of
separation are followed by two postulates corresponding to the first
two postulates of Leonard and Goodman.
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DEFINITION I  A n  interval s is part of an interval t if  every interval
separate from t  is separate from s. s is a proper part o f
t  i f s  i s  p a r t  o f tbut not identical ivith I. i f s  is part f t, t  is said to contain s.
DE FIN I TION 2  A n  interval s overlaps on interval t i f  they have
some part in common.
POSTULATE I  I f s  is a part oft and I is a part of s, then s and t are
identical.
POSTULATE 2 s  overlaps t i f f  s and t are not separate.
It follows that 'part of' is transitive and reflexive, 'proper part of' is
transitive. irreflexive and asymmetric, 'is separate from' is symmetric
and irreflexive and 'overlaps' is symmetric and reflexive.
The sum, product and difference o f two intervals do not always
exist, there being no null interval. They exist only when certain
conditons are fulfilled. In the case of the product of two intervals, no
further concepts need be introduced and the conditional definition can
be given directly, together with a postulate establishing the existence
of the product under the appropriate conditions. Uniqueness is easily
established so that reference to the product is justified.
DEFIN I TION 3  I f  the intervals s and t overlap, then an interval r is
the product of s and t if  every interval separate from r i.s s eparate from
s or t, und conversely.
POSTULATE 3 I f  the intervals s and t overlap, then there exists an
interval r such that every interval separate from it is separate from s
or t, and conversely.
The sum of two intervals also exists when they overlap, but following
Hamblin (1971), in addition when the two intervals just come into
contact with one another, or abut. As was noted in the introductory
section, Hamblin's notion o f  abutment carries an implication o f
precedence not intended here. The concept of interest here is sym-
metric, and can be defined as follows :
DEFINITION 4  T wo  intervals abut if they are separate and there is
an interval overlapping both but not any other separate from both.
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The sum of two intervals can now be defined, and a postulate is laid
down guaranteeing its existence under the appropriate conditions.
DEFIN I TION 5 I f  the intervals s and I either abut or Overlap, then
an interval r is the sum of s and t if  every interval separate from r is
separate from both ,s and t, and conversely,
POSTULATE 4 I f  the intervals s and t either abut or overlap, there
exists an interval r such that every interval separate from r is' separate
from both s and t, and conversely.
The difference between two intervals remains to be considered. It is
not sufficient simply to  say that an interval s is a proper part o f
another interval t  as a condition o f  the existence o f  the difference
between s and t, because there might be parts of t separate from s
lying on both sides of s. What is required is that s is both a proper part
of t and shares a boundary with t i.e . ,  s abuts t internally:
DEFINITION 6  T wo  intervals abut internally i f  one is part o f  the
other and there is an interval abutting both.
DEFINITION 7 I f  the intervals s and t abut internally and s is a
proper part oft, then the interval r is the difference between t and s if
every part o f r is a part o f t and seperate from s, and conversely.
It is not necessary to lay down a postulate to the effect that the
difference exists under the appropriate conditons because this is
provable on the basis of the other postulates, as will be shown in due
course.
The possibility of two intervals abutting internally at the beginning
or end of time, or at the edge of some break in time, which would raise
difficulties for definition 6, is excluded by later postulates guarantee-
ing that there are no intervals limiting the extent of time and no gaps
occur not occupied by intervals. To express these properties of time a
concept of order among intervals is necessary. The fundamental order
relation here is to be a three-place betweenness relation, defined as
follows:
DEFINITION 8 A n  interval s lies between the intervals r and t ifs
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is separate from both r and t, and every two intervals, each separate
from s and such that one contains r and the other t, are separate from
one another.
Some basic relations between the mereological properties and the
order relation can be established at this point.
THEOREM I f  an interval s lies between two parts of an interval t,
then s is also part o f t.
This follows immediately from definition 8 and the i n
-
e f l e x i v i t y  o f  t h e
separation relation.
THEOREM The re  is no interval between two abutting intervals.
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from every interval separate from both u and v exists which overlaps
both u and v. By postulate 4, sum (r, u) and sum (r, v) exist. Consider
any ,s separate from u and v,  which must be separate from r.  By
definition 5, s is then se p a l
-
a te  f r o m  
s u m  
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since u is part o f  sum (r, u ) and y is part o f  sum (r, y), s cannot lie
between u and v given definition 8 because obviously sum (r, u) and
um (r, v) overlap.
The choice of the postulates of order adopted here is based on the
extensive work of Huntington and Kline (Huntington and Kline (1917)
and Huntington (1924)). From the definition o f betweenness follow
two immediate consequences which correspond to postulates A and D
of Huntington and Kline:
THEOREM A  triple o f intervals standing in the betweenness rela-
tion is symmetric in the sense that the interchange of the first and the
third intervals is always allowed.
THEOREM Th e  member
s o f  a  
t r i p l e  
o f  
i n t e r v a l
s  
s t a n d
i n g  
i n  
t h
e
betweenness relation are mutually separate and therefore distinct.
The remaining three postulates needed for the present correspond,
respectively, to  Huntington and Kline 's postulates B  and C,  and
Huntington's postulate 9 in his 1924 paper.
POST U LATE 5 I f  r, s and t are three pairwi.se separate intervals,
one lies between the other two.
56 P A U L  NEEDHAM
POSTULATE 6 i t  is never the case that an interval ,ss lies between
two intervals r and t and that I also lies between r and .s.
POSTULATE 7 I f  an interval s lies between the intervals r and t,
and u is an interval separate from all three, then s lies either between r
and it or between u and t.
In the 1924 paper Huntington showed his five postulates to  be
independent and deduced from them eight theorems concerned with
four distinct individuals, the antecedents of which can be thought of as
all the possible ways in which two individuals can stand to two fixed
individuals on a line. Abbreviating 's lies between r and / • to 'B (est)',
and thinking of s and / as the two fixed intervals, these theorems are as
follows. (It is assumed that all four intervals are mutually separate.)
TI B  lust) & B (sir) D B (usr)
T2 B  (ust) & B (sw) D B (usr)
T3 B  (ust) & B (svt) D B (art)
T4 B  (sut) & B (
m ' )  D  
B  
( s a y )  
y  
B  
( s l a
t )
T5 B  (sat) & B (sri) B  (sur) y B (rut)
T6 B  (list) &  B (rst) D B (art) y B (rut)
T7 B  (list) & B(rst)D  B (at's) y B (rus)
T8 B  (ust) & B (vst) D B (urs) v B (rut)
A further abbreviation can now be introduced, writing 'B (asti')' for
'B (us!) &  B (sty)', since it is determined how all four triples chosen
from it, s, /  and v stand in the bet weenness relation by T1 and T3.
Three existential postulates now follow.
POSTULATE 8 I f  the intervals s and t are se p a l
-
a t e ,  e i t h e r  t h e y
abut or there exists an interval r between them which abuts both.
POSTULATE 9 F o r  every interval ,s• there exist intervals r  and t
between which s lies.
POSTULATE 10 Eve ry interval has a proper part.
Postulate 8 is a non-metric form of the Archimedian axiom guaran-
teeing that (if, as intended, intervals are thought of as finite) no two
intervals lie infinitely far apart, and excludes gaps in time. Postulate 9
says that time extends indefinitely in both directions and postulate 10
ensures the infinite divisibility of intervals.
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Tense logicians have sometimes been concerned to work with a
system o f  temporal order which makes no specific commitment on
these matters, establishing completeness of a propositional tense logic
relative to a minimal system of temporal order. O f  course, specific
modifications can be made for the purpose of any particular applica-
tion. And if no commitment is to be made on whether time is linear or
circular, there might be something to be said for adopting GrOnbaum's
procedure (Griinbaum (1973)) o f  working, instead o f  a three-place
betweenness relation, with a four-place relation of separation closure
which could be defined as follows :
The intervals r and s separate the intervals t and u if  all four intervals
are mutually separate (in the tnereological sense) and every interval
containing s and separate from t and u is separate from r.
But the central concern here has been to adopt assumptions which
certainly seem highly plausible, in  the absence o f  good counter
arguments, in order to obtain a complete axiomatisation (see section
IV).
However, it is interesting to note in this connection that in the usual
treatments of time as a system of structureless points in tense logic,
the introduction of a condition analogous to postulate 9, to the effect
that there is no first nor last moment of time, is consistent with time
being circular (so long as it remains infinitely divisible, which means
denseness in  the case o f  instants). But this is not the case with
postulate 9 in the present system (where infinite divisibility is also
maintained). I f  time is circular, then given three intervals standing in
the betweenness relation, each interval either abuts two of the others
or there exist abutting intervals between to fill the gaps. In any case,
successive applications of the sum operation yield an interval which
exhausts the whole of time. But this is impossible, for according to
postulate 9, there exist two intervals lying on either side o f  every
interval and there just cannot be an interval which is the whole o f
time.
Circular t ime, together with  other closed topologies, i s  a lso
excluded by postulate 6, which is now deducible as a theorem from
postulates 8 and 4 given definition 8.
It is  also possible to  establish the result mentioned earlier in
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connection with  the discussion o f  the mereological properties o f
intervals.
THEOREM F o r  every proper part s o f  an interval t which abuts t
internally, the difference between t and s exists and abuts s.
To facilitate the presentation o f the proof, an ancilliary lemma is
first stated
LEMMA I f  r abuts ,s• then there is an interval I abutting s such that
B frst
Proof of theorem : Assumes is a proper part o f
t  a n d  a b u t s  t  
i n t e r n a l l y .
Then there is an interval u abutting both, by definition 6. This implies
that ther  is a  interval  abutting t such that B (uty) (lemma), and
therefore B (usy) and s is separate from y. Now let z be any part o f
tseparate from s (at least one such exists by the first assumption).
Clearly, z is separate from y and s, and so by postulate 5, either B (zsy)
or B (zys) o r B (szy). Suppose B  (zsy). This, together with B  (usy),
implies B  (uzs) o r B  (zus) by T7  (the separation prerequisites are
satisfied). But since u and s abut, B (uzs) is impossible and therefore
B (zus). But this is also impossible by definition 8 since both z and s
are parts o f
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together with B (usy) implies B (zyu) by TI. But this is inconsistent,
given postulate 6, with the result established from the lemma, namely
B (uty), which implies B  (uzy). Th is leaves the th ird  alternative,
B (szy), which holds for any z separate from s which is part o f  t.
Consider any two such intervals. By postulate 9, either they abut, or
ther  is an interval between them abutting both, which is also a part of
I by an earlier theorem. In  any case, they can be summed to yield
another interval separate from s which is part o f  t. The difference
between t and s is the largest such interval (containing all the intervals
separate from s and part of t). To show tha t
,  a b u t s  s ,  
s u p p o s e  
n o t .
Then either r and s overlap, o r there is an interval between them
(postulate 8). r does not overlap s since all its parts are separate from
s. And any interval x between s and
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impossibility if  it is also between s and r.
Corollary Every interval can be divided into an abutting pair.
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This follows directly given postulates 8, 9 and 10.
I ll
An asymmetric, dyadic order relation is not definable in the present
system (this is easily shown using Padua's method). But it is possible,
following the basic idea of Huntington's (Huntington (1938)), to define
one in terms of betweenness together with an ordered pair of intervals
stipulating a direction. For want of a better term
. I  s h a l l  r e f e r  
t o  t h e
'earlier t an' relation, and its converse as the 'later than' relation. In
fact, as explained in the introductory section, these definitions do not
suffice to define the 'earlier than' and 'later than' relations proper, but
only necessary conditions to be satisfied by them.
DEFINITION 9  L e t  p and q be two fixed, separate intervals and
define p as earlier than q. Suppose u and v are two separate intervals.
Put s = p if  neither it nor v overlap p. Otherwise, form a sum of p With
it and v and any intervals lying between them. Then let s be one of the
intervals lying on either side of this sum such that B(spq). Similarly,
put =  q if  neither u nor v overlap q, and otherwise let t be an interval
separate from u and v such that B(pqt) as before. Then u is earlier
than v provided B (stuv) or B (sutv) or B (suvt) or B (ustv) or B (ta ll) or
B (uvst).
DEFINITION 10 A n  interval u is later than an interval v i f  v is
earlier than u.
The fundamental properties of the dyadic order relation are estab-
lished in the following theorem.
THEOR EM Th e  'earlier than' relation is irreflexive, connected (in
the sense that, given two separate intervals, one is earlier than the
other) and transitive.
Irreflexivity follows immediately from the requirement that only
separate intervals stand in the 'earlier than' relation. For connectivity,
suppose u and y are two separate intervals and that ,s• and t are defined
as in definition 9. Then these four intervals are pairwise separate and
by postulate 5, o f  the following twelve possible permutations o f
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I B (ust) 2. B (sut) 3. B (uts)
4. B (suv) 5. B (itvs) 6. B (usv)
7. B (vst) 8. B (sit) 9. B (vis)
10. B (utv) 11. B (uvt) 12. B (vat)
betweenness orderings, at least one from each row must be true ; and
at most one, by postulate 9.
Consider 2, for example, which may be combined with exactly one of
4, 5 and 6. Suppose it  is combined with 4; then by T6, either 8 or 9
must be chosen from the third row. I f  8 is chosen, 8 together with 4
implies 11 by T2 and the ordering of the quadruple is B (suit). I f  9
rather than 8 is chosen, this and 2 imply 10 by 12 and the overall
ordering is B(sutv). I f  instead 2 is combined with 5, 8 follows by T3
and then 12 by T2, yielding B (svut). And combining 2 with 6 yields
B (tusv). Proceeding similarly from I  and 3, eight additional possible
orderings are obtained giving a total o f  twelve. These twelve pos-
sibilities can be considered to  divide into a disjunction o f  twelve
disjuncts equivalent by definition 9 to 'it is earlier than v or v is earlier
than u'.
Transitivity is established by repeated applications of De Morgan's
laws, the details of which are omitted here.
I v
Rational numbers can be used to construct models for the logic of
temporal intervals in  several ways. Amongst the simplest involves
interpreting the temporal intervals as intervals o f  rational numbers
with distinct end points open above and closed below, separation
being null intersection. Equally, the rational intervals with distinct
end points open below and closed above would serve just as well, the
asymmetry o f  these rational intervals not being a  feature o f  the
temporal intervals.
If symmetric, open o r closed rational intervals are to  be used
instead, other steps must be  taken t o  avoid singleton and nu ll
intervals. The temporal intervals can be interpreted as closed inter-
vals of rationals with distinct end points provided separation is now
defined as the absence of such an i
n t e r v a l   a s  
a  c o m m o n  
s u b s e t  
o f  
b o t h
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the separate intervals. I f  open intervals are chosen, separation can
now be defined in  terms o f  null intersection as before, but some
account must be taken of the sums of abutting intervals, which do not
include the common end point. This can be done by not distinguishing
an open interval o f  rationals with distinct end points from any set
differing by lacking at most a finite number of members. Temporal
intervals are then interpreted as sets of such sets, any one of which
can represent the temporal interval in the separation relation.
The basic result o f  this section concerns denumerable models o f
this sort.
THEOREM Th e  logic o f temporal intervals is t
o
-
c a t e g o r i c a l .
Without going into all the details of the proof, a 1-1 onto mapping
which preserves separation can be defined along the following lines.
Let A be the set of rational intervals of the model first outlined at
the beginning of this section, and let a
°
,  a
1
, 0
2
,  b e  
a n  
e n u m e r a t i o
n
of them. Suppose Q is an arbitrary, denumerably infinite model and
g
o
,  
c
h
,  
(
1
2
,  
a
n  
e
n
u
m
e
r
a
t
i
o
n  
o
f  
t
h
e  
m
e
m
b
e
r
s
.  
A 
m
a
p
p
i
n
g  
f  
f
r
o
m 
A 
t
o
Q can be defined as follows. Put f (a
0
) =  g
o
.  N o w  
c o n s i d e r  
h o w  
n
o  
n d
a, are related. One o f  them might contain the other, they might
overlap whilst retaining parts separate from the other, they might abut
or, finally, there might be another interval lying between them. In
every case, a sequence o f abutting intervals is found which can be
summed to yield an interval a l containing a
o  a n d  a , .  F o r  
e x a m p l e .  
i f
there is an interval between a ,  and a
l
,  t h e n  t h e r e  
i s  a n  
i n t e r v a l
abutting both, and a l is the sum of these three. [ fa ,  and a, overlap but
nei her contains he other, then the difference between the product of
a, and a, and a, abuts the product, which in turn abuts the difference
between the product and a, .asi' is in this case the sum of these last
three intervals. The procedure is similar in the other cases, though
sometimes requiring some results not explicitly mentioned in section
Il but which are easily established as ancilliary lemmas. Then f (a
l
) i s
defined as the first member of Q in the enumeration which bears the
same relation to g
o  t h a t  a
l  
b e a r s  
t o  
a
o
.  
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intervals from which a l is constructed occur later in the enumeration
of A and are assigned, respectively, the first members of Q which bear
the corresponding relations to g
o
.  T h e  f i r s t  
m e m b e r  
i n  
t h e  
e n u m e r
a -
tion of Q not yet assigned is then considered in relation to g
o  a n d  a
62 P A U L  NEEDHAM
sum a l  o f  abutting intervals constructed in  similar fashion. These
intervals are then assigned, respectively, under the mapping f, to the
first members in the enumeration of A bearing the same relation to a,
that they bear to g
o
. T h e  
r e l a t i o
n  
t o  
a l  
o f  
t h
e  
f i r
s t  
m e
m b
e r  
o
f  
A  
n
o
t  
y
e
t
assigned an image under f  is then considered, and a sum a '
2
' c o n -
structed from an abutting sequence of intervals as before, partitioning
ov rlapping intervals by the difference operation where necessary.
Assignments are then made as before. Alternating between A and Q in
this way ensures that all members o f  each set are correlated with
distinct members o f  the other. I t  is easily verified that for any a
i
,
a
i 
 
A
,  
a
i  
i
s  
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
e 
f
r
o
m 
a 
i
f
f  
f
(
a
i
)  
i
s  
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
e 
f
r
o
m 
f  
(
(
L
i
)
.
COROLLARY Th e  logic of temporal intervals is complete.
This follows immediately by Vaught's criterion since finite models
are precluded by postulates 9 and 10.
V
In the papers referred to in section I, Hamblin showed how instants
could be defined in terms of his intervals within a wider, set-theoreti-
cal setting. The entities so defined satisfy the axioms of dense linear
order without endpoints. It is natural to ask whether the assumptions
of set theory can be dispensed with and the same results achieved
within the confines of a first-order theory. The purpose of this final
section is to say sufficient to show how the logic of temporal intervals
presented in section II can be modified to achieve this.
The basic move is to  distinguish the mereological relations o f
separation and non-overlapping. As before, non-overlapping is to be
understood as the absence of a common interval, definitions I  and 2
remaining unchanged. But the primitive relation o f  separation now
receives a stronger interpretation, excluding any contact whatsoever
including common instants. Accordingly, postulate 2 is dropped in
favour of the weaker postulate
POSTULATE 2' I f  two intervals overlap, they are not separate,
which is just the left-to-right implication of postulate 2. The symmetry
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of the relation o f separation must now be established by a distinct
postulate:
POSTULATE 2"  i f s  is separate .
f r o m  t ,  t h e n  
t  i s  
s e p a r a t e  
.
f r o m  
s ,
but i n
-
e f l e
x i v i t
y  
f o
l l
o w
s  
d i
r
e
c t
l y  
f
r
o
m  
p
o
s
t
u
l
a
t
e  
2
'
.
The definitions and postulates of the former system must now be
r viewed from this new perspective and some further modifications
are required. In particular, it is now possible to distinguish between
abutment in the sense of non-overlapping with no intervening interval.
and a stronger relation of touching defined as neither overlapping nor
being separate. I f  the former definition of the product of two times is
then modified so that it exists not only when they overlap, but also
when they touch (and the corresponding existence postulate changed
accordingly), an instant can be defined as the product of two touching
times, and has the property of having no proper parts. (Postulate 10
must be restricted to non-instants.) The axioms of dense linear order
without end points are satisfied by instants defined in this way.
An intermediate logic is also possible here, the general idea o f
which is to modify postulate 2 as above, but to leave the existence
postulate for the product unchanged. This opens up the possibility of
distinguishing between what can be called open and closed intervals
whilst at the same time not recognising the existence o f  instants
explicitly. However, the details will not be pursued in this paper. (
2
)
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